Cluster Development Test 2: An Assessment of a Failed Test by Machin, Ricardo A. & Evans, Carol T.
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
1 
Cluster Development Test 2 an Assessment of a Failed Test 
 Ricardo A. Machin1 and Carol T. Evans2
On 31 July 2008 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Crew Exploration 
Vehicle Parachute Assembly System team conducted the final planned cluster test of the first 
generation parachute recovery system design. The two primary test objectives were to 
demonstrate the operation of the complete parachute system deployed from a full scale 
capsule simulator and to demonstrate the test technique of separating the capsule simulator 
from the Low Velocity Air Drop pallet used to extract the test article from a United States 
Air Force C-17 aircraft. The capsule simulator was the Parachute Test Vehicle with an 
accurate heat shield outer mold line and forward bay compartment of the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle Command Module. The Parachute Test Vehicle separated cleanly from the pallet 
following extraction, but failed to reach test conditions resulting in the failure of the test and 
the loss of the test assets. No personnel were injured. This paper will discuss the design of the 
test and the findings of the team that investigated the test, including a discussion of what 
were determined to be the root causes of the failure. 
  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 
I. Introduction 
HE Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is the next human rated space craft under development for the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), designed to replace the Space Shuttle for low earth orbit 
missions. The CEV will be a capsule that uses a parachute system to decelerate and safely land the crew, similar to 
Apollo only larger. The CEV Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) is a Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) 
project led by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) responsible for the development, qualification, and delivery of the 
parachute system that will be used on the first three human flights.  
 The Generation 1 (Gen-1) CPAS architecture was described in detail at the 19th AIAA Aerodynamic Decelerator 
Systems conference in 20071
II. The Test Hardware 
. The purpose of the Gen-1 design was not only to field and test a parachute recovery 
system that would meet the stated requirements, but also to develop the relationship between the design and test 
teams in preparation for the flight design and qualification testing.  
 Cluster Development Test 2 (CDT-2) was the last planned test of the Gen-1 system. This was the first test to 
utilize the Parachute Test Vehicle (PTV), a boiler plate of the CEV consisting of an accurate forward bay where the 
CPAS was rigged, as well as a full scale heat shield to generate the proper wake for the parachutes. Figure 1 shows a 
comparison of the PTV to the CEV.  In order to meet the requirements of the United States Air Force (USAF) for 
Low Velocity Air Drop (LVAD) test articles, the PTV total height was truncated by XX inches. This was 
accomplished by maintaining the exact geometry of the forward bay and truncating the back shell of the PTV, this 
resulted in a shelf at the interface of the back shell to the forward bay that does not exist on the CEV. Wind tunnel 
tests and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) were performed in order to understand the effects of this change to 
the Outer Mold Line (OML) on the flow field in the wake of the PTV. The results of this analysis indicated that 
there ?? differences, if any, were within the predicted accuracy of the techniques. The wind tunnel testing and the 
CFD also provided aerodynamic data for the PTV which was used in the trajectory analysis. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of PTV and the CEV. 
 
 The PTV was rigged to a modified LVAD platform so that it could be extracted from a USAF C-17 aircraft. The 
CEV PTV Separation System (CPSS) was designed and manufactured by Coleman Engineering under contract to 
CPAS. There were three penetrations to the heat shield of the PTV that allowed the CPSS to restrain the PTV. 
Coleman provided the trajectory simulation from extraction through PTV release. The remainder of the PTV 
trajectory was modeled by the CPAS team using the Decelerator System Simulation2
III. Development of the Concept of Operations 
. The Coleman contract also 
included the development and implementation of the parachute recovery system to safely land the CPSS. 
From the concept of operations point of view the test was broken into four phases: 1) extraction through PTV 
release, 2) the programmer phase where the PTV was stabilized and delivered to the CPAS deployment test point, 3) 
the CPAS test sequence itself through to landing the PTV, and 4) the recovery of the CPSS.  
A. Extraction through PTV Release 
The purpose of the CPSS was to restrain the PTV during extraction and release it such that the programmer 
phase could safely commence. The modeling of this phase was complicated as it involved not only the extraction of 
the combined PTV/CPSS out of the C-17, but also included contact forces between the CPSS and the PTV which 
could impart rates to the PTV as it released. The CPSS was designed to implement a delayed load transfer in order 
to induce a pitch limit cycle of the combined PTV/CPSS with the extraction parachute still attached to the pallet via 
the Extraction Force Transfer Coupling (EFTC). This phenomenon of a pitch limit cycle has been observed on other 
tests that implemented a delayed load transfer and it was felt that it could be accurately modeled in the simulations. 
The intent was to release the PTV from the CPSS at the first minimum of under rotation that would take place 
following extraction. Releasing at this first minimum (or inflection point) in the under rotation would provide the 
best chance of separating the PTV without re-contacting  the CPSS. This point in the trajectory also nearly coincides 
with the lowest dynamic pressure for deploying the programmer parachute, allowing an increase in programmer 
reefing such that it would remain within the design loads of the attach structure on the top of the PTV. The initial 
conditions or state vector of the released PTV were taken from the Coleman simulation and handed off to the CPAS 
trajectory team for deployment of the programmer parachute. Figure 2 shows the PTV rigged to the CPSS prior to 
loading on the C-17. 
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Figure 2. PTV rigged to the CPSS. 
 
B. PTV Programmer Phase 
The purpose of the programmer phase was to stabilize the PTV following release from the CPSS and deliver the 
PTV to the intended state vector for initiation of the CPAS test sequence. The programmer parachute initially 
chosen was the Orbiter 40 ft decelerator parachute. This parachute was chosen because it was available without 
requiring development testing, it had been used as a programmer on prior tests, and it had a relatively large design 
limit load. After investigating a variety of possible locations for storing the programmer parachute, the decision was 
made to rig it to the starboard windward shoulder of the PTV (with respect to the PTV/CPSS as extracted from the 
C-17). The static line for the programmer was anchored to the forward end of the pallet just beneath the programmer 
was rigged to the PTV.  
Early simulations of the PTV free flight once separated from the CPSS indicated that deploying the programmer 
to a three point attach through the top of the forward bay (much like the main attach) there was a greater than 90% 
chance that the PTV would tumble through apex into the wind prior to the programmer parachute inflating. Because 
the PTV did not have a Forward Bay Cover the risk of damaging the CPAS hardware stored in the forward bay was 
considered high and it did not seem possible to protect this hardware without interfering with its proper deployment. 
The two parameters that had the greatest affect on the apex forward tumble were the initial rate of the PTV as it 
separated from the CPSS and the time delay from PTV release to programmer inflation. The only solution modeled 
that would stabilize the PTV using the programmer was to have an intermediate attach on the side of the PTV for the 
programmer. This would result in the PTV flying ‘sideways’ for six seconds allowing for the dynamics to damp out 
prior to repositioning the programmer to the intended three point attach on the top of the PTV. While this 
modification eliminated the apex forward tumbles that would pass through alpha zero, the simulations still indicated 
that approximately 30% of the cases would reach an apex forward angle of attack. The addition of stabilization 
parachutes, deployed with the programmer parachute but which were more closely coupled to the PTV release, 
drove these apex forward cases to less than 10%. They were subsequently added to the test configuration. The 
programmer and stabilization parachutes would be released from their three point attach 30 seconds after PTV 
release. Figure 3 depicts the test sequence for the extraction and programmer phases. The wake effect on the 
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performance of the programmer and stabilization parachutes was estimated by taking the available wind tunnel and 
CFD data, both of which represented a time average wake deficit. 
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 Figure 3. Concept of Operations: Extraction through Programmer Reposition. 
C. CPAS Test Sequence  
The CPAS test sequence was to be the nominal sequence with one modification. There was interest in 
demonstrating the CPAS Gen-1 system with the drogues deploying directly to full open in order to build confidence 
in the implementation of the CPAS for the Pad Abort 1 flight test where the drogues will not have a reefed stage. 
This modification was considered acceptable because it would also provide altitude margin for reaching full open on 
the mains in case we lost more altitude in the earlier phases of the test. The pre-test trajectory prediction had the 
PTV reaching full open mains at 3,800 ft AGL. In order to prevent overloading the drogues the programmer was 
disreefed to full open prior to release. Drogue mortar fire was sequenced to be coincident with programmer release. 
Figure 4 depicts the CPAS test sequence. 
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Figure 4. Concept of Operations: CPAS Sequence 
D. CPSS Recovery Phase  
The CPSS also had a sequencer which would release the delayed load transfer 110 seconds after extraction, 
allowing the 28 ft extraction parachute to deploy the CPSS recovery parachutes. The recovery parachutes consisted 
of two 15 ft stabilization parachutes and a cluster of three G-11 canopies. 
IV. CDT-2 Sequence of Events 
The Test Readiness Review (TRR) was completed with no outstanding actions other than planned day of test 
activities. All day of test final closeouts were performed as planned. The aircraft took off, climbed to the drop 
altitude and flew a nominal cold pass. The test article was extracted on a nominal hot pass at the specified release 
conditions, the extraction was nominal. 
The PTV separated from the CPSS in a heat-shield–into-the-wind attitude (angle of attack of 180 deg). The 
programmer and stabilization parachutes deployed nominally from their respective deployment bags. The 
stabilization parachutes, however, did not inflate following initial deployment. The programmer did inflate 
following deployment., Because the PTV was at an angle of attack of approximately 180 degrees, the programmer 
inflation load went through the initial side attach point, which caused the PTV to pitch over through apex forward to 
roughly XX degrees angle of attack. The rotation caused the programmer and stabilization parachute risers to wrap 
up around the PTV, decreasing the trailing distance of the parachutes with respect to the PTV and pulling the 
parachutes further into the vehicle wake. The programmer parachute collapsed during this initial pitch oscillation 
just as the pitch rate approached zero. As the PTV completed the first limit cycle and started the second, the 
programmer and stabilization attach point repositioned at the planned mission elapsed time to a point above the 
PTV. Reposition from the initial side attach to the three point attach on the top of the PTV released an additional 16 
ft harness assembly which increased the trailing distance between the parachutes and the PTV. Following reposition, 
the stabilization parachutes fully inflated for the first time. The programmer parachute, however, did not re-inflate. 
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Without an inflated programmer the PTV continued to oscillate in a pitch limit cycle and reached a higher than 
planned terminal dynamic pressure. The PTV avionics correctly executed the planned test sequence releasing the 
programmer and stabilization parachutes and mortar-deploying the drogue parachutes at the planned time. 
Unfortunately, the PTV was inverted when the drogue parachutes started to inflate. As a result, both of the drogue 
parachute risers were severed as they loaded across the remaining structure from the programmer initial attach point 
on the side of the PTV. This sequence is represented in snap-shot form in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. PTV Deploy Sequence through Drogue Risers Severed 
 
The force from the drogues inflating imparted a moment to the PTV which caused the PTV to tumble. The PTV 
aerodynamics had no way to damp this tumble which resulted in the free-stream dynamic pressure to continue to 
increase. As the PTV angular rates increased in the free flight, centrifugal forces caused the main parachute retention 
system to allow a premature deploy of the mains, prior to the pilot mortars being fired. The auto-deployment of the 
mains resulted in the deployment of the riser and suspension lines while the main deployment bag remained near the 
vehicle. When the canopy portion reached line stretch and was finally exposed to the air stream, the high dynamic 
pressure and the enormous relative velocity of this part of the parachute with respect to the vehicle caused the 
suspension lines to fail, releasing the canopy portion of the parachute. The aforementioned was the failure 
mechanism for the first two main parachutes. The remaining main parachute reached line stretch before the canopy 
was deployed. As a result this chute remained attached through the initial inflation. The high dynamic pressure 
inflation of the last main caused most of the vent region sail area of the canopy to fail, and as a result this main 
parachute never had enough pressurization to disreef. However, this single flagging main did provide enough drag 
area to stabilize the PTV into a limit cycle about the normal heat shield forward trim point. The test avionics 
completed the test sequence, firing the three pilot mortars just before the PTV struck the ground. The PTV was 
damaged beyond repair. All hardware landed on the drop zone and no individuals were injured as a result of the test. 
Following release of the PTV, the CPSS repositioned at the planned time and deployed the recovery parachutes. 
The CPSS was recovered without damage. 
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V. Mishap Findings 
Per JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook, a Mishap Investigator (MI) was appointed. The MI findings 
determined that an Engineering Investigation Team (EIT), not a Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) investigation, 
was sufficient: 
Finding 1: No injuries or illnesses occurred due to the failure 
Finding 2: Damage was limited to the test article 
Finding 3: Test article debris all landed on the designated drop zone 
Finding 4: Test article damage and its cause were anticipated and the test planning, hazard analysis, and test 
readiness review process characterized and accepted the risk of that particular damage/cause 
VI. Engineering Investigation Team Process and Findings 
 The CPAS project formed the membership of the EIT. The EIT used a fault tree based process to determine 
the cause(s) of the test failure. The fault tree was generated with causes beginning with extraction from the aircraft 
and continuing through to impact. It was decided to define the top tier of the fault tree as “Failed to Achieve Test 
Conditions”. This was justified in that all failures after that point were effects, not causes. A closure sheet was 
generated for each fault tree branch or individual block. Each closure sheet was reviewed and approved by the EIT 
leader and EIT technical lead. CPAS parachute experts were asked to review the sheets and concur or provide 
dissenting opinions. As the final conclusions were developed, the team experts were individually asked for their 
conclusions and dissenting opinions.  
The EIT presented its findings in three reviews. A detailed technical review of the data and findings included 
representatives from the CPAS technical team, JSC Systems Architecture and Integration Office (EA3) 
management, EA3 Chief Engineer, JSC Program Engineering Integration Office (EA4) Chief Engineer’s office, JSC 
Structural Engineering (ES) parachute expert, CEV Flight Test Office (FTO), CEV Crew Module Office (CMO), 
JSC Safety, and a representative from the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Applied Research and Engineering 
Sciences (ARES) parachute team. A management review was held including JSC Engineering Directorate (EA) 
management and the CEV CMO. The final review of the findings was presented to the Constellation Project 
Configuration Board (CPCB). The conclusions and recommendations presented at all of these reviews were 
accepted with no dissenting opinions.  
A. Data Collected 
The EIT coordinated the post test inspection of the test hardware.  The PTV and CPSS structures remained at 
YPG. The PTV parachutes were sent to Airborne Systems in Santa Ana, CA for inspection.  The CPSS parachutes 
remained at YPG.  The extraction parachute system remained at YPG.  The avionics systems were sent to JSC.  The 
test videos were recovered by YPG video support.  
The failure analysis was based post test inspection of the test articles (hardware and parachutes), review of 
procedures and test build-up documentation, review of the data available, and expert engineering opinion. The data 
sources available included: ground to air videos, C-17 on-aircraft video, PTV onboard video, CPSS onboard video, 
chase helicopter video, CPSS instrumentation (impact recorders, accelerometers, attitudes and rates), PTV 
instrumentation (impact recorders, accelerometers, attitudes, rates, and static pressure), Winpak measured 
atmospheric properties, Kineto Tracking Mount Time Space Position Information (PTV trajectory), and PTV based 
differential GPS trajectory.  
B. Failure Cause and Contributing Factors 
The EIT found the test failure was caused by the programmer parachute failing to remain inflated. Two detailed 
causes for the programmer failure were identified and both are attributed to wake effects.  
1) The test design did not consider the effects of large pitch motions changing the trailing distance of the 
stabilization and programmer parachutes. The decrease in parachute trailing distance was caused by 
wrapping up the programmer and stabilization parachute risers around and over the PTV. Post test analysis 
indicated that the programmer trailing distance varied from the intended XX PTV diameters to a minimum 
of YY PTV diameters. This in turn caused the parachutes to produce less drag due to the lower local 
dynamic pressure present in the airflow. In addition, the periodic variations in the flow field associated with 
the limit cycle the vehicle was experiencing were not modeled in the simulations. The performance of the 
programmer and stabilization chutes was modeled only at the trailing distance associated with a fully 
inflated parachuted.  
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2) The test design did not consider the trailing distance effects of the stabilization parachutes in combination 
with the PTV on the performance of the programmer parachute. Post test analysis performed by Rice 
University indicated that the local dynamic pressure at the mouth of the programmer with both the PTV and 
the stabilization parachutes present was approximately half that with only the PTV as a fore body (Figure-
6). Rice’s time accurate analysis of this flow field in the wake of the combined PTV and inflated 
stabilization parachutes also showed a pronounced increase in fluctuations of the local dynamic pressure, 
almost certainly contributing to the programmer collapse and failure to re-inflate. 
 
Dr. Tayfun Tezduyar, Rice University  
Figure 6. Wake Dynamic Pressure with and without Stabilization Parachutes 
 
The EIT also found three contributing factors.  
1) Extraction and separation pre-test models were not robust. This manifested itself in several aspects of the 
pretest predictions. The CPSS vendor was only able to provide a single PTV release state vector or Initial 
Condition (IC). In order to account for modeling uncertainties, a Monte Carlo analysis was conducted using 
dispersions about this IC as inputs. The actual condition experienced in the test, angle of attack around 180 
deg at programmer inflation, was not a product of the dispersed trajectory predictions. However, post test 
simulations showed that this IC should have been acceptable, provided the stabilization parachutes had 
initially inflated and the programmer had remained inflated. While the modeling did not cause the test 
failure, it did not accurately predict the actual test conditions and provided the requirement for stabilization 
parachutes, the EIT determined that the models were a contributing factor.  
2) Late completion of the PTV/CPSS separation concept of operations resulted in PTV structural limitations 
that required reefing the programmer to 20% in order to limit the inflation loads. Pretest simulations 
indicated that holding the single point attach on the side of the PTV for six seconds following separation 
would provide sufficient damping to safely achieve the reposition to the three point attach. Unfortunately, 
the PTV structure was fully designed and built by the time the final deployment concept of operations 
generated the requirement for a single point attach. The structural limitations associated with the late 
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addition of an initial side point attach, contributed to the selection of the programmer inflation reefing ratio, 
which the EIT determined was a contributing factor to the test failure.  
3) The programmer reefing configuration contributed to the programmer parachute collapse and failure to re-
inflate. Because the programmer did initially inflate, the reefing ratio alone did not cause the failure. 
However, once the programmer collapsed during the wrap-up, the reduced air flow into the programmer due 
to the reefed opening hindered re-inflation. Furthermore, once the stabilization chutes were inflated, their 
wake effect further hindered programmer re-inflation. When the programmer reefing line was released, the 
programmer still did not re-inflate, indicating that the reefing ratio alone was not the cause of the failure. 
Post flight analysis that took into account the high geometric porosity of the Orbiter 40 ft drag parachute 
suggests that the reefing ratio could have been as low as 14%. Since the reefing line design did not cause the 
failure, but likely made it worse, it was determined that the reefing line design was a contributor to the test 
failure. 
VII. Conclusion 
Several generic recommendations were driven out of the EIT process that are relevant to the development of a 
complicated multi-body parachute test as was attempted on CDT-2. 
1) Have a completed concept of operations supported by trajectory simulations prior to completion of 
manufacture of the test article. 
2) Do not use multiple parachutes in series at the same time without giving consideration to the combined 
wake effect on each parachute deployed at any one time. 
3) Use parachutes that have been demonstrated at the reefing ratios that will be implemented in the test. 
4) Account for the effect the motion of the payload attach point  on the effective trailing distance of the 
parachutes. 
5) Make every attempt to simplify the design of the test. As the modeling and analysis become more 
complicated, the ability to adequately represent the physics of the test becomes increasingly more 
difficult.  
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